Abstract: Due to avoiding the key escrow problem in the identity-based cryptosystem, certificateless public key cryptosystem (CLPKC) has received a significant attention. As an important part of the CLPKC, the certificateless authenticated key agreement (CLAKA) protocol also received considerable attention. Most CLAKA protocols are built from bilinear mappings on elliptic curves which need costly operations. To improve the performance, several pairing-free CLAKA protocols have been proposed. In this paper we propose a new pairing-free CLAKA protocol. Compared with the related protocols our protocol has better performance. We also show our protocol is provably secure in a very strong security model, i.e. the extended CanettiKrawczyk (eCK) model.
Introduction
To realize information security, the public key cryptography has been widely used in networks communications. In the traditional public key cryptography (PKC), there is a need for certificate to assurance to the user about the relationship between a public key and the identity of the holder of the corresponding private key. So there come the problems of certificate management, including revocation, storage, distribution etc. [1] . To solve the above problem, Shamir introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography (ID-PKC) [2] . In ID-PKC setting, a user's public key can be derived from his identity (e.g., his name or email address) and his secret key is generated by the Key Generation Center ( KGC). Then there come the key escrow problem, i.e. the PKG knows all the user's secret keys. In 2003, Al-Riyami et al. [3] proposed the certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) to solve the key escrow problem. Since then the CLPKC received a significant attention.
After Al-Riyami et al.'s work [3] , numerous certificateless authenticated key agreement (CLAKA) protocols, using bilinear mappings on elliptic curves, have been proposed, e.g., [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . However, the relative computation cost of a pairing is approximately twenty times higher than that of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [11] . Therefore, CLAKA protocols without bilinear pairings would be more appealing in terms of efficiency. Recently, several CLAKA protocols without pairing have been proposed in [12] [13] [14] [15] . Yang et al. [14] pointed out that neither Geng et al.'s protocol [14] , nor Hou et al.'s protocol [13] is secure. He et al. [15] also proposed a CLAKA protocol without pairing. However, He et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the type 1 adversary [16] . Although the latest CLAKA protocol [16] is more efficient than other protocols [12] [13] [14] [15] , it is provably secure under the mBR model [17] , which is a very weak model. Yang et al. have shown that their scheme is provably secure in a very strong model-the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model [18] . However, the user in Yang et al. ' protocol needs nine elliptic curve scalar multiplications to finish the key agreement.
Moreover, the user has to verify the validity of public keys. This not only increases the burden of the user, but also reverses the thought of CLPKC. In this paper, we will propose a new pairing-free CLAKA protocol, which is provably secure in the eCK model. Besides, our protocol has better performance than the related protocols.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some preliminaries. In Section 3, we propose our CLAKA protocol. The security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, performance analysis is presented. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries

Notations
In this subsection, we first introduce some notations as follows, which are used in this paper. , p n : two large prime numbers; 
Background of elliptic curve group
Let the symbol / p E F denote an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field 
and with the discriminant 
G is a cyclic additive group in the point addition "+" defined as follows: Let , P Q G ∈ , l be the line containing P and Q (tangent line to / p E F if P = Q ), and R , the third point of intersection of l with / p E F . Let l′ be the line connecting R and O . Then P "+" Q is the point such that l′ intersects / p E F at R and O . Scalar multiplication over / p E F can be computed as follows:
.
Let the order of G be n . The following problems are commonly used in the security analysis of many cryptographic protocols. The GDH assumption states that the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve the GDH problem is negligible.
CLAKA protocol
A CLAKA protocol consists of six polynomial-time algorithms [2, 8] Lippold et al. [9] transformed original eCK model [18] from the traditional PKI-based setting to the CLPKC setting. The eCK model in the CLPKC setting is defined by the following game between a challenger C and an adversary { 1, 2} ∈ A A A . The game runs in two phases. During the first phase, the adversary A is allowed to issue the following queries in any order: 
Our protocol
In this section, we will propose a new CLAKA protocol based on previous works [9, 14, 16] . Our protocol consists of six polynomial-time algorithms. They are described as follows.
Setup : This algorithm takes a security parameter k as an input, returns system parameters and a master key. Given k , KGC does the following steps. 2) KGC chooses the master private key * n x Z ∈ and computes the master public key pub P xP = .
3) KGC chooses two cryptographic secure hash functions 
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Thus, the correctness of the protocol is proved.
Security Analysis
In this section, we will show our scheme is provably secure in eCK model. H as two random oracles [19] . For the security, the following lemmas and theorems are provided.
Lemma 1.
If two oracles are matching, both of them will be accepted and will get the same session key which is distributed uniformly at random in the session key sample space. construct an algorithm C to solve the GDH problem.
Let 0
n be the maximum number of sessions that any one party may have.
Assume that the adversary 1 A activates at most 1 n distinctive honest parties.
Assume that the adversary 1 A activates at most 2 n distinctive hash queries.
Assume also that 1 ( ) Adv k
A is non-negligible. Before the game starts, C tries to guess the test session and the strategy that the adversary 1 A will adopt. C randomly selects two indexes ( , , , Since 2 H is a random oracle, the probability of guessing the output of 2 H
, which is negligible. The input to the key derivation function 2 H includes all information that can uniquely identify the matching sessions. Since two non-matching sessions can not have the same identities and the same ephemeral public keys and 2 H is modeled as a random oracle, the success probability of Key-replication attack is also negligible. Thus Guessing attack
and Key-replication attack can be ruled out, and the rest of the proof is mainly devoted to the analysis of Forging attack. As the attack that the adversary 1 A mounts is Forging attack, 1 A can not get an advantage in winning the game against the protocol unless it queries the 2 H oracle on the session key.
The rest of this section is mainly devoted to the analysis of the Forging attack. To relate the advantage of the adversary 1 A against our protocol to the GDH assumption, we use a classical reduction approach. In the following, a challenger C is interested to use the adversary 1 A to turn 1 A 's advantage in distinguishing the tested session key from a random string into an advantage in solving the GDH problem. The following two sub-cases should be considered.
CASE 1.1:
No honest party owns a matching session to the Test session.
CASE 1.2:
The Test session has a matching session owned by another honest party. 
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where the value sk comes from S L .
Otherwise, C chooses a random number {0,1} k sk ∈ and stores the tuple (   1  2  3 , , , , , , ,
( ) RevealPartialPrivateKey i : C answers 1 A 's queries as follows. 
Otherwise, C replies according to the specification of the protocol. 
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is non-negligible since we assume that 1 ( ) Adv k A is nonnegligible. This contradicts the GDH assumption.
We could conclude that the advantage of a type 1 adversary against our protocol is negligible if the GCDH problem is intractable.
Lemma 2.
Assuming that the GDH problem is intractable, the advantage of a type 2 adversary against our protocol is negligible. n be the maximum number of sessions that any one party may have.
Assume that the adversary 2 A activates at most 1 n distinctive honest parties.
Assume that the adversary 2 A activates at most 2 n distinctive hash queries.
Assume also that 2 ( ) Adv k A is non-negligible. Before the game starts, C tries to guess the test session and the strategy that the adversary 2 A will adopt. C randomly selects two indexes 
CASE 2: Guessing attack:
2 A correctly guesses the session key. Through the same analysis, we know the success probability of Keyreplication attack and Guessing attack is also negligible. Thus Guessing attack and Key-replication attack can be ruled out. As the attack that the adversary game against the protocol unless it queries the 2 H oracle on the session key.
In the following, a challenger C is interested to use the adversary 2 A to turn 2 A 's advantage in distinguishing the tested session key from a random string into an advantage in solving the GDH problem. The following two subcases should be considered.
CASE 1.1:
CASE 1.2:
The Test session has a matching session owned by another honest party.
The analysis of CASE 1.1:
Since 2 A is strong type 2 adversary, then he can get any users' partial private key since he is a malicious KGC. According to Definition 2, C has the following two choices for 2 A 's strategy: x Z ∈ , sets xP as the system public key pub P , selects the system parameter (   1  2  3 , , , , , , ,
Otherwise, C chooses a random number {0,1} k sk ∈ and stores the tuple (   1  2  3 , , , , , , , Otherwise, C chooses a random number {0,1} k sk ∈ and stores the tuple ( , , , ,
i P x P = and stores ( , , , , (   1  2  3 , , , , , , 
ID ID T T ). If
there is no such entry, C choose a random number {0,1} k h ∈ and stores the new entry (   1  2  3 , , , , , , , stores the tuple (   1  2  3 , , , , , , , We could conclude that the advantage of a type 2 adversary against our protocol is negligible if the GCDH problem is intractable.
From the above three lemmas, we can get the following theorem. Theorem 1. Our protocol is a secure CLAKA protocol in the eCK model under the GDH assumption.
Comparison with previous protocols
Let mBR and eCK denote the modified Bellare-Rogaway model [17] and the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model [18] separately. For the convenience of evaluating the computational cost, we define some notations as follows. [14] , and He et al.'s protocols [15, 16] . Table 1 shows the comparison between pairing-free CLAKA protocols in terms of efficiency, security model and underlying hardness assumptions.
Since the scalar multiplication operation of point is more complicated than the addition operation of points, modular invasion operation and the hash function operation, then our protocol has better performance than Geng et al.'s protocol [12] , Hou et al.'s protocol [13] and He et al's protocol [15] . Moreover, Geng et al.'s protocol [12] , Hou et al.'s protocol [13] and He et al's protocol [15] are not secure against type 1 adversary. Then our protocol has advantage in both the performance and the security over Geng et al.'s protocol [12] , Hou et al.'s protocol [13] and He et al's protocol [15] . It is well known that the eCK model is much superior to the mBR model. Then Yang et al.'s protocol [15] and our protocol has advantage in security to He et al.'s protocol [16] . At the same time,
